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Abstract
We argue that a certain type of many minds (and many worlds) inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics due to Lockwood (and Deutsch) do not
provide a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilis-
tic algorithm. By contrast, in Albert and Loewer’s version of the many
minds interpretation there is a coherent interpretation of the quantum
mechanical probabilities. We consider Albert and Loewer’s probability
interpretation in the context of Bell-type and GHZ-type states and ar-
gue that it exhibits a certain form of nonlocality which is, however, much
weaker than Bell’s nonlocality.
1 Introduction
In this paper we shall consider the question whether and how the notion of
probability makes sense in many minds interpretations of quantum mechanics.
We shall further focus on the implications of the notion of probability in these
approaches on the question of nonlocality. We shall mainly refer to two versions
of many minds interpretations: Albert and Loewer [3] and Lockwood [13] that
have been discussed in some detail in a special symposium hosted by this Journal
[21]. Lockwood’s approach to probabilities seems to be accepted amongst many
authors in the many worlds tradition (though with dierent styles) e. g. Deutsch
[5], Zurek [25], Saunders [19], Papineau [16], Vaidman [22], and others. It is
in fact based on Deutsch’s [5] approach to probabilities in his many worlds
interpretation. In what follows it will be Deutsch’s approach to probabilities
and Lockwood’s variant of it in his many minds interpretation that we shall
criticize. We shall also consider Albert and Loewer’s stochastic version of many
minds in the context of Bell’s theorem.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. We rst briefly present Albert and
Loewer’s version of the many minds interpretation and we set up the prob-
lem of interpreting the probabilities in a many minds (worlds) picture (section
2). In Section 3 we then present and discuss Lockwood’s version of the many
minds interpretation, and we argue that Lockwood’s probability interpretation
is wanting. Then in section 4 we argue that the Albert Loewer many minds
interpretation implies a certain weak form of nonlocal correlations on the level
of the minds. Finally, in Section 5 we demonstrate the nonlocality of the Albert
Loewer interpreration using the Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger [10] (GHZ)
set up.
To get a quick grip on many minds interpretations consider the scheme of a
generic (impulsive) measurement of the z-spin variable of an electron in noncol-
lapsing quantum mechanics. Take a composite of quantum system, apparatus





⊗ jψ0i ⊗ j0i, (1)
where jαj2 + jβj2 = 1. Here the jzi are the z-spin eigenstates, jψ0i is the ready
state of M and j0i is some suitable state of O’s brain initiating conscious
mental states. We assume that the evolution of the global state is described
by the Schro¨dinger equation alone, i. e. there is no collapse of the quantum




αj+zi ⊗ jψ+i+ βj−zi ⊗ jψ−i

⊗ j0i, (2)
where as can be seen a one-to-one correlation is brought about between the spin
states jzi and the pointer states jψi, but in such a way that the quantum
states of both S and M become entangled in (2). The interaction between M
and the observer O takes the global state to the nal superposition
jΨfi = αj+zi ⊗ jψ+i ⊗ j+i+ βj−zi ⊗ jψ−i ⊗ j−i

, (3)
where the ji are the observer’s brain states corresponding to her mental
states1. As can be seen the state (3) is now also entangled and the reduced
state of the observer is truly mixed. If one takes this story to be complete sim-
pliciter (called by Albert [2] the bare theory), then one faces the measurement
problem since the measurement has no denite result. On this view the quantum
1We shall assume throughout that the set of brain states corresponding to all possible
outcomes of all possible experiments forms a basis in the brain’s Hilbert space. This is a
preferred basis in the Hilbert space corresponding to the (subjective) mental states associated
with conscious perception.
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statistical algorithm which is an algorithm about the probabilities of measure-
ment results makes no sense (see Albert [2] Chp. 6 for more details). Thus in
order to avoid the measurement problem, one needs somehow to supplement the
bare theory’s description.
2 Albert and Loewer
Many minds interpretations take the bare story to be indeed complete and
exactly true but only with respect to the physics, including the physics of the
brain. In other words, the quantum state never collapses and no hidden variables
are added to the quantum mechanical description. To supplement the bare
story, assumptions are made with respect to the mental states ji. Albert
and Loewer [1988] make the following two assumptions:
AL1 The brain states corresponding to mental states ji are associated at
all times with a continuous innity of nonphysical entities called minds
(even for a single observer)2.
AL2 Minds do not obey the Schro¨dinger evolution (in particular, the superpo-
sition principle) but evolve in time in a genuine probabilistic fashion. For
a given measurement, involving a conscious observer, there is one specic
probability measure, given by the Born rule, that prescribes the chances
for each mind to evolve from an initial ji to a nal brain- mental state
jii.
In the measurement scheme above each single mind corresponds initially to
the state j0i and evolves in a stochastic fashion to one of the two nal brain-
mental states ji with the usual born probabilities: jαj2 for a + result and
jβj2 for a − result. The divergence of the minds occurs during the evolution
of the global state from (2) to (3). Let us denote by j(m)i a quantum brain
state indexed by a subset m of the set of minds. The complete description of
the post-measurement state includes the quantum state, and the corresponding
subsets of the set of minds. Therefore, one needs to replace (3) with
jΨf (m,n)i = αj+zi ⊗ jψ+i ⊗ j+(m)i + βj−zi ⊗ jψ−i ⊗ j−(n)i. (4)
Here we use the notation Ψf (m,n), to make explicit the Albert Loewer idea
that the quantum brain states are indexed by subsets of the set of minds. In
the state (4) we see that the minds in the subset m follow the brain state in
the + branch of the superposition, and those in the subset n follow the brain
state in the − branch. The evolution of the minds is genuinely stochastic. This
means that before the minds actually diverge into the branches in the state (2),
there is no determinate fact of the matter about which branch each one of the
2The motivation of assuming a multiplicity of minds here is the so-called mindless hulk
problem (see Albert [2]).
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minds will eventually follow. The membership of a given mind in the subset m
(or n) becomes a fact at the same time that the nal state (4) obtains. The
standard quantum mechanical probability is thus understood as the chance for
each single mind to end up in either the m-subset or the n-subset in the state
(4).
To sum up, we can characterize Albert and Loewer’s interpretation as fol-
lows. (i) There are no collapses, but the expansion of the global state (4) in
terms of the brain states jii and their relative states, e. g. the pointer states
jψii, is taken to describes our experience. (ii) There is a random element built
into the theory. The fact that the time evolution of the minds is stochastic is
depicted by the quantum mechanical probabilities. (iii) The probability mea-
sure is conditional on a given measurement. (iv) Individual minds (unlike the
proportion of minds) do not supervene on brain states. This means that an
m-mind can be exchanged with an n-mind in the superposition (4) with no
corresponding change in the physics. In fact, the chance interpretation of the
probability measure in AL2 implies this failure of supervenience in Albert and
Loewer’s version. This is the so-called dualistic aspect of this version (see e. g.
Lockwood [13], Loewer [12]).
Let us see how the Albert Loewer approach reflects on the relationship be-
tween branching and relative frequencies. As is well known, this is a major prob-
lem in the Everett picture where the number of branches resulting from a given
quantum measurement is not related to the quantum mechanical probabilities.
For example, in a measurement with two possible results the quantum state will
consist of two branches corresponding to the two results of the measurement ir-
respective of the probabilities for each result. This has the consequence that in
a repeated measurement the relative frequencies of an outcome (along a branch)
will most likely mismatch the quantum mechanical predictions. It then follows
that the empirical success of quantum mechanics, as observed by us, must be
viewed as a miracle since most of the Everett branches will not exhibit the right
quantum mechanical frequencies.
This problem can be solved if one postulates that the standard Born rule,
applied for each measurement, represent the probability of the branch. In other
words, one simply brings in the probability as an extra postulate in addition
to the branching. An example of such a process. consists of a measurement at
t1 with two possible results and probabilities 13 and 23. Then follows another
measurement, at t2 with three possible results whose probabilities are 12, 13, 16
respectively, and so on. A suitable law of large numbers can be proved for such
a tree. In particular, in a sequence of identical measurements, the frequency on
almost all branches will be close in value to the quantum mechanical probability
distribution on the set of measurement outcomes. (e. g. Everett [7], DeWitt
[6], Hartle [11].). The Albert Loewer approach provides a simple explanation:
Each individual mind performs a (classical) random walk on the tree, with the
probabilities indicated on the branches. The fact that a typical mind perceives
the quantum mechanical frequencies simply follows from the theory of random
walks (or branching processes).
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However, quantum mechanics assigns, in advance, probabilities to all possible
measurement trees. Given a quantum state of the system, we can calculate
in advance the probabilities of all possible sequences of measurements. Thus,
as an alternative to the previous process, we could have performed at t1 a
measurement with three possible outcomes whose probabilities are 15, 35, 15,
do nothing at at t2, and then, at t3, perform another measurement with two
possible outcomes, and so forth. The probability for each step in the sequence
is known at the outset. Schro¨dinger [20] noticed that "at no moment in time
is there a collective distribution of classical states which would be in agreement
with the sum total of quantum mechanical predictions". This means that while
each measurement sequence can be seen as a classical random walk, there is
no [non contextual] classical probability distribution which assigns the correct
probabilities to all the branches of all possible trees simultaneously. This is a
major dierence between the quantum concept of probability and the classical
one. One manifestation of this dierence is the violation of Bell inequalities.
(Pitowsky [1994]).
We can see why the assumptions of Albert and Loewer are almost inevitable.
Suppose, contrary to AL2, that the trajectory of each mind is predetermined
before measurement. Now, consider Alice and Bob who participate in a typical
EPR experiment, Alice on the left and Bob on the right. In each run they can
each choose a direction along which to measure the spin. We now face the task
of choosing, in advance, the appropriate subsets for each person set of minds,
corresponding to each possible result, in each possible choice of directions. From
Bell’s theorem it follows that the only way to do that, and obtain the right
probabilities, is to violate locality. In the present context this means that the
trajectories of some Alice minds depend on Bob’s choice of direction and vice
versa. What we have, in other words, is a non local hidden variable theory in
disguise (with he minds playing the role of hidden variables). This is part of the
reason why Albert and Loewer assume that the membership of a given mind in a
given subset becomes a fact only at the same time that the nal state (e.g. state
(4)) obtains. They do not assume that there is a distribution on the set of minds
that explains the sum total of quantum mechanical predictions. Only after the
experiment, a random partition of the set of minds into the appropriate subsets
is induced.
3 Probabilities in Lockwood’s Version
Lockwood’s [13] approach to probabilities is essentially a transposition of Deutsch’s
[5] approach from a many worlds setting to a many minds setting. For conve-
nience we shall focus on Lockwood’s many minds version, but our analysis can
be applied mutatis mutandi to Deutsch’s many worlds. Lockwood aims explic-
itly at a picture in which there is full supervenience of the minds on the brain
states (or the corresponding branches) and there is absolutely no stochastic
behavior of the minds. He thus assumes:
LOC1 The brain states corresponding to mental states ji are associated at
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all times with a continuous innity of nonphysical entities called minds .
Minds supervene on the brain states ji.
Lockwood’s idea of supervenience of the minds on the ji means that he
rejects the description of Albert and Loewer given by the state (4) and adopts
instead the description given by (3) as a complete description of the physics and
of the minds. In other words, in the theory of Albert and Loewer brain states
are indexed by subsets of minds, whereas in Lockwood’s version subsets of minds
are indexed by brain states.
To make sense of the quantum mechanical probabilities Lockwood denes a
probability measure over subsets of the minds as follows.
LOC2 The standard Born rule denes a unique probability measure over sub-
sets of minds, such that for any measurement (involving a conscious ob-
server) the measure prescribes the proportions of minds following each
nal branch of the superposition. For example, in the post-measurement
state (3), the subset of minds following the + branch is assigned the mea-
sure jαj2 and the subset of minds following the − branch the measure
jβj2.
Thus, for Lockwood too, the quantum measure describes how many minds
follow each branch of the post-measurement state (such as state (3)). Let us
also note that Deutsch’s [5] probability measure is essentially the same except
that it is dened over subsets of worlds.
Lockwood’s version diers from Albert and Loewer’s with respect to the
interpretation of probability in that the evolution of the minds is not random in
the Albert Loewer sense. It is not at all clear what the dynamics of the minds
in Lockwood’s version is. Nor is it clear how he intends to make it compatible
with supervenience. We shall consider two possible interpretations:
1) Let  be the set of minds of the observer. Minds supervene on brain
states. This means that with each brain state ji , which corresponds to a
conscious perception of a measurement outcome, Lockwood associates a subset
m(ji)  . Suppose that j+i is the brain state of an observer perceiving
"spin up" (of a quantum system and apparatus in a given state, on a given
day, in a given weather, and so on (including whatever it takes to specify the
brain state uniquely). Then the probability measure of the subset m(j+i) is
jαj2. Now, if we assume that the association ji ! m(ji) of brain states with
minds subsets is xed in advance of any measurement, we run into a problem.
We require, in fact, a probability measure on the set of minds that will be in
agreement with the totality of quantum mechanical predictions. This implies
non locality and contextuality in the dynamics of the minds that was explained
in the previous section3.
2) So perhaps Lockwood endorses what Loewer [12] calls the instantaneous
minds view. On this view it is assumed that minds do not persist in time in the
3Notice that even if the minds’ labels were to fix only probabilistically the evolution of the
minds, Bell’s theorem would still apply, as long as the postulation of a probability measure
that explains all predictions is not dropped.
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sense that there is no unique succession relation between any one of the minds
at an earlier time and any one of the minds at a later time. One could think
about this view as denying that a label can be attached to each mind at an
early time, that would distinguish it from all the other minds at a later time.
As a result, this view holds that there are no facts of the matter concerning the
evolution of a single mind between any two times, and in particular between
times during which the quantum state evolves into superpositions of branches
indexed by dierent mental states.
Consider, for instance, the time evolution taking the state (2) at time t1 to
the nal state (3) at time t2. On the instantaneous view all we can say about
the behavior of the minds is that at t1 the total set of the minds is attached to
the state j0i, and at t2 a subset of the minds with measure jαj2 is attached
to the nal brain state j+i and a subset with measure jβj2 to the brain state
j−i. However, there is no fact of the matter as to which mind in (2) evolved
into which branch in (3) in the sense that there is no uniquely true mapping of
the minds at t1 to any one of the two subsets in t2 (see Lockwood [13] p.183).
It seems, however, that Lockwood also wants to maintain that , the set of
all minds, is itself time invariant. To put it dierently, minds are not created
and destroyed through time (presumably, until the person dies). Now, this is
utterly inconsistent with the instantaneous minds view. The rst axiom of set
theory, the axiom of equality, states that two sets are equal when they have the
same elements. If  at t1 is identical to  at t2 there always exists a mapping,
or a succession relation between the minds at the two times. Simply take the
identity mapping! Likewise, there is always \a fact of the matter" regarding
which element λ 2  is an element of the subset m(j+i).
And so, if  is time invariant, each mind in fact is labeled through time
just as Albert and Loewer insist. But then the question of whether Lockwood’s
minds evolve genuinely stochastically or deterministically (see also Buttereld
[4]) is still pertinent. In other words, Lockwood has to provide a clear answer
to the question whether his proposed dynamics of the minds conforms to the
Albert Loewer stochastic type, in which case he has to give up on supervinience.
Alternatively, he can adopt the deterministic version, in which case the state of
one’s mind is sometimes determined by remote spacelike separated events.
But perhaps Lockwood would insist that  is not time invariant, and at each
time t there exists a dierent set of minds t. Minds are born with every exper-
iment, they briefly supervene on the brain state, and then die like butterflies.
What precisely such a theory explains is not clear to us4.
It is entirely possible that Lockwood intends an interpretation that is com-
pletely dierent from those that we have discussed. However, as far as we can
tell, the Albert Loewer stochastic non supervening character of the minds is
necessary, if one wishes to have probabilistic asserions in the usual sense of the
word in the Everett tradition, while keeping the theory local in Bell’s sense.
4Note that our argument applies to all the versions of the many worlds interpretation.
These include the early formulations by Everett [7] and DeWitt [6], as well as later versions
by Zeh [24], Deutsch [5], Zurek [25], Vaidman [22], Saunders [19], and also post-Everett
approaches of consistent (decoherent) histories e. g. by Griffiths [9], and Gell-Mann Hartle [8].
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4 Chance and Nonlocality
We now turn in to analyze more carefully the question of locality in the Albert
and Loewer version. Albert and Loewer [3] and Albert [2] (see also Maudlin
[14]) argue that their version is completely local. On the other hand as we
saw their chancy evolution of the minds is designed to deliver the standard
quantum mechanical predictions which, we know, violate the Bell inequality.
The stochastic evolution of the minds which occurs after an actual measurement
solves the problem of Bell’s nonlocality. However, in what follows we shall argue
that there is a weaker notion of locality that is violated even in the Albert
Loewer version.
Let us start with Albert and Loewer’s argument. Consider the singlet state






and suppose that observer 1 (Alice) measures some spin observable of particle 1,
and observer 2 (Bob) measures some (not necessarily the same) spin observable
of particle 2. The overall state after these two measurements will be a super-
position of branches (in general four branches). In each branch one of the two
measurements has some denite outcome. Now, Albert and Loewer’s argument
is that no matter which observable gets measured by Bob, the chances of Alice
to see a + result or a − result are exactly one-half. On this picture this means
that one-half of the minds of Alice will see an up result and one-half will see a
down result independently of the measurement of Bob. And the same goes for
Bob5. Moreover, Albert and Loewer stipulate that the evolution of the minds
of each observer is controlled by the reduced physical state of that observer
alone. And as we have just argued this is sucient to insure that the evolution
of the minds will satisfy the frequencies predicted by the quantum mechanical
algorithm. According to Albert and Loewer, this is as far as the many minds
picture goes.
In particular, Albert and Loewer argue, there are just no matters of fact
about the correlations of the minds of Alice and Bob. And if no such correlations
obtain, the Albert Loewer picture is ipso facto local and Bell’s theorem is simply
irrelevant at this stage. The correlations of which Bell’s theorem is about, they
maintain, will obtain only in a local way by means of an additional physical
interaction between Alice and Bob (or between each one of them and a third
observer). For example, when they communicate to each other (or to a third
party) their results. Once such a local communication occurs it is easy to see
that the many minds picture gives the correct quantum mechanical predictions.
We take it, however, that there are correlations between the minds of Alice
and Bob prior to any local interaction between them. It is true that the chance
distribution of each of the observers’ minds is independent of the measurement
5And of course this fact does not depend on the time order of the two measurements (or
the reference frame in which we choose to describe the measurements).
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on the other wing. This just means that the reduced state of each of the ob-
servers is independent of the interactions occurring on the other wing. This
feature is a transposition of the standard quantum mechanical no-signaling the-
orem. Moreover, we accept Albert and Loewer’s dynamical rule for the minds
according to which the evolution of the minds of each observer is controlled
solely by the reduced (local) state of that observer, and independent of the
state of the other observer. But in no way does this imply that there are no
correlations between the subsets of minds of the two observers after the minds
of Alice abd Bob have evolved to the nal state, and prior to any interaction
between them.
The minds of each observer do perceive at the end of the measurement some
denite result. This means that after the measurements in the two wings we can
view the minds as if they are labeled by these measurement results. Therefore,
we can right down a list comparing the labels, and this list inevitably must
include all information regarding the correlations between the labels. It follows
that in Albert’s and Loewer’s picture there must be a matter of fact about the
correlations between the sets of minds tracking dierent branches. Any later
communication between Alice and Bob simply reveals these correlations.
Consider for simplicity a setting in which the two observers happen to mea-
sure the same observable. The overall state of the two particle system and the






Consider a single run of the experiment. Let us follow the track of a single
Alice-mind call it λA. It ends up believing a + result with probability one half
and a − result with a probability one half. Similarly for a given Bob-mind λB .
If we repeat the measurement N times the mind λA traces a path connecting
N vertices on the binary tree of possible results, and the same goes for λB . If,
later, λA happens to meet λB and compare notes it always turns out that λA’s
path is the mirror image of λB ’s. That is, they believe to have opposite set of
results. To put it dierently, an Alice-mind will never encounter a Bob-mind
that does not have the exact opposite set of results: a + for every − and vice
versa. What is the ground for this correlation in the many minds interpretation?
If we insist, as Albert and Loewer do, that the event: "λA believes a + result"
is independent of the events in Bob’s wing, we must add by stipulation the
correlations that λA and λB discover after their meeting. It is an unexplained
"harmony of minds"added ex hypothesis. However, this harmony must have
been established long before the meeting because the list of results recorded by
λA and λB is xed at the time of the experiment.
Or, consider an alternative argument: Suppose that a third observer (call
her Carol) were to measure whether or not the composite state of particle 1
and 2 and of Alice’s and Bob’s brain is indeed the one given by (6). So Carol
measures a non local observable (call it χ) of which the state (6) is an eigenstate
with eigenvalue +1. A measurement of χ will then yield the result +1 with
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probability one6 without thereby changing the state (6). This means that the
following conditional is true: "If Carol were to measure χ, then she would know
with probability one that the minds of Alice and Bob are (anti-)correlated"7.
Moreover, she would know that there is now a matter of fact about the (anti-
)correlations of the minds. That is, the result of the χ measurement is faithful.
In Albert and Loewer’s version this means the following: All the minds of
Carol agree on the result +1 of the χmeasurement . Therefore, Carol can predict
with certainty that Alice’s and Bob’s minds will exhibit the anti correlations
when they communicate. In fact, there is a good reason to suppose that Alice
and Bob can each perform the χ measurement on her/his own (see Albert [1])
without locally communicating their results to each other. If this is true it
implies that they will know, by the result of the χ measurement, that their
minds are (anti) correlated. (But not which Alice-mind and Bob-mind are
matched).
The quantum mechanical equations of motion entail that the amplitude of
the ++ and −− branches in the state (6) are now, prior to any local interac-
tion between the observers, zero. We take this to mean that the minds of the
observers Alice and Bob are in fact (anti-)correlated whenever the state (6) ob-
tains, and regardless of whether any local interaction between the observers will
or will not occur in the future. We shall call this kind of nonlocal correlations
the weak minds-correlation8.
We see that there are indeed nonlocal cross-wing (actual but not counterfac-
tual) correlations between the minds of the two observers. However, it is a weak
nonlocality which falls short of Bell’s theorem. What is crucial in Bell’s theorem
is the existence of a single probability measure dened over all possible (actual
and counterfactual) measurements. And this is just what is denied by Albert
and Loewer by stipulating that the evolution of the minds of each observer is
xed by that observer’s reduced state alone. In this way the derivation of a
Bell inequality is formally blocked. By contrast, in the case of the deterministic
reading of Lockwood’s version there just is, by denition, a single probabil-
ity measure over the set of minds which agrees with all quantum mechanical
predictions. This assumption leads directly to Bell’s theorem.
5 Albert Loewer and GHZ
6Notice that in the χ measurement the result +1 has probability one that is conditional
only on the quantum state, but not on any additional parameter.
7Although the χ measurement will not provide information about which minds of observer
1 are (anti-)correlated with which minds of observer 2.
8It is much easier now to see that the same conclusion follows also in all the many worlds
interpretations, e. g. of Deutsch [5], Zurek [25], Vaidman [22], Saunders [19], for which the
argument above shows that the brain states of Alice and Bob are in fact correlated in each
of the worlds associated with the two branches of the state (6) irrespective of whether a local
interaction between Alice and Bob will or will not subsequently occur.
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An even more revealing case of a weak minds-correlation is that of Greenberger,






where the kets jzii (i = 1, 2, 3) denote the z-spin state of particle i. Suppose
that the three particles are located in space-like separated regions. In this state
standard quantum mechanics predicts a + or − result of the local measurements
of the z-spin of each particle with probability one-half (with collapse onto the
corresponding branch). And likewise for measurements of the x- and y-spins of
each particle.
However, for this specic state standard quantum mechanics also predicts
certain correlations between the results of the three observers, in particular the






















It is easy to see that the state (7) is an eigenstate of the four observables with
eigenvalues indicated on the right. Assuming that the local observables σix, σiy
take on denite values that are xed locally, and satisfy the correlations (5), we
can easily derive the contradiction
− 1 = σ1xσ2xσ3x = σ1xσ2yσ3y = 1. (9)
This is the GHZ simplication of Bell’s theorem.
In standard quantum mechanics (with a collapse hypothesis) this contra-
diction is avoided since the local observables σix, σ
i
y are assigned no denite
individual values in the initial state (7) As usual, the collapse itself is nonlocal
in the sense that the result of the local measurements σix or σiy on each wing
of the experiment depends on which observables get measured on the two other
wings and on their outcomes in the following way.
(X) If the three observers choose to measure the x-spins of their particles (call
it the x-context), then with probability one, whatever result each of them
obtains, observer 1 will obtain a + (−) result if and only if the product of
the results of observers 2 and 3 is − (+).
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(Y) If observers 2 and 3 choose to measure the y-spin of their particles (call it
the y-context), and observer 1 still happens to measure the x-spin of his
particle, then with probability one, whatever result each of them obtains,
observer 1 will obtain a + (−) result if and only if the product of the
results of observers 2 and 3 is + (−).
Let us now consider what these correlations imply in Albert and Loewer’s
version. We will show that in this version whatever result is perceived by any
given mind of observer 1 depends nonlocally on which observables get measured
by observers 2 and 3. Suppose that as a matter of fact the three observers carry





x respectively. Consider the expansion of the GHZ-state (in the x-spin






In this nal state we can see that the marginal probabilities for a + or − result
of the local measurements of each observer is one-half (that is, the proportions
of the minds of each observer perceiving a + or − result are exactly one-half).
Moreover, as in the singlet state, the (anti-)correlations described by (X) above
are brought about since the quantum mechanical amplitudes of the branches
with strict correlations in the state (5) is now zero. Hence, when the nal
state (5) obtains the minds of the three observers are weakly correlated now,
in the sense that the quantum mechanical unconditional probability that these
correlations will obtain on measurement is one. A similar analysis applies for
the y-context.
Given this weak minds-correlation we can divide the minds of the three
observers in the x-context into four subsets of minds corresponding to the four
branches of the state (5). In two of these subsets the minds of observer 1 perceive
a + result and the minds of observers 2 and 3 perceive results that are dierent
in sign, either +− or −+. Let us call these two subsets the up-channel. In the
other two subsets the minds of observer 1 perceive a − result while the minds
of observers 2 and 3 perceive the same results, either ++ or −−. Call these two
subsets the down-channel. In the Albert and Loewer version for each mind of
each one of the three observers the probability of ending up in either the up- or
the down-channel is exactly one-half.
Suppose now that (contrary to fact) the three observers were to carry out
the measurements in the y-context instead of the x-context. In this case we
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would obtain a state similar to (6) but with the strict correlations described
by (Y) above where the amplitudes for anti correlations is exactly zero. That
is, we shall also have two nal channels: an up-channel in which the minds
of observer 1 perceive a + result and the minds of observers 2 and 3 perceive
the same results, either ++ or −−; and a down-channel in which the minds
of observer 1 perceive a − result while the minds of observers 2 and 3 perceive
dierent results, either +− or −+. Again the probability for each mind of the
three observers to end up in either one of the two -channels is one-half.
We now argue that in the Albert and Loewer version the evolution of the
minds in the GHZ setting can recover the quantum mechanical correlations
(described by (9)) only if the following constraint is satised: For each mind λ1i
of observer 1, λ1i follows the up-channel if and only if λ
1
i follows the down-
channel (and likewise: λ1j follows the down-channel if and only if λ
1
j follows the
up-channel). This means that for any given mind λ1i of observer 1, λ1i perceives
a + (−) result in the x-context if and only if it would have perceived a − (+)
result in the y-context. And in this sense the evolution of the minds is nonlocal.
To see why such a constraint must be satised suppose that it did not. This
means that for each mind of observer 1 that happens to follow the up-channel
in the x-context there is a non-zero chance of evolving into the up-channel in
the y-context. Then, on the many minds picture, we shall obtain in fact that
a positive fraction of the up-channel minds (of observer 1) are also up-minds
(although it is contingent which of the up-minds will turn out to be an up-
mind). Now, perhaps the essential feature of the Albert and Loewer version
is that for each mind there is a fact of the matter (though contingent) as to
which channel it happens to follow in each of the two contexts. Given a mind of
observer 1 that happens to evolve into the up- and up channels, we can easily
derive a contradiction from the GHZ relations (9). Therefore, in the Albert
Loewer version such minds cannot exist, and so the evolution of the minds of
each observer depends nonlocally on which observables get measured in space-
like separated regions in the sense of the weak minds correlation in the state
(5).
Finally let us make two remarks about the above argument. (i) On the
Albert and Loewer version whatever minds of each observer end up in each
channel are not rigidly attached to one another. That is, the minds of observers
2 and 3 that follow the up-channel in the x-context will not always be the same
minds that happen to follow the up-channel in the y-context. This will happen
because the actual evolution of the minds in each context is truly stochastic.
But this fact is irrelevant to the above argument. Recall that what the proof
shows is that there is a correlation between which channel the minds of observer
1 happen to follow (i. e. what result they perceive) in the x-context and which
channel the same minds (of observer 1) follow (what result they perceive) in
the y-context. To derive the contradiction it is sucient to assume that there
are some minds λ1i of observer 1 in both the up and up channels.
(ii) It is evident that the above proof exhibits a counterfactual relation since
the measurements of the local observables in the two contexts do not commute.
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Thus in counterfactual terms given that one-half of the minds of observer 1
evolve into the up-channel, our proof shows that all these minds would have
evolved (with certainty) into the down channel had observers 2 and 3 choose to
carry out the y-measurements. In these terms we argue that the Albert Loewer
version must violate the condition called by Redhead [18] local counterfactual
deniteness. What we have shown, however, is that this condition is violated not
merely because the evolution of the minds is stochastic, but rather because it is
nonlocal in the sense of the weak minds-correlation in the state (5). However,
since the weak form of these nonlocal correlations is a feature of the uncollapsed
quantum state, such as (5), we take it that these nonlocal correlations do not
exhibit a dependence on a reference frame, and this means that such a theory
can be made fundamentally relativistic. But this is another issue
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